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Advice on management and operations (not public relations and organizational consultancy)

Defence Nuclear Material Transport Operations refer to the movements of military Defence Nuclear Materials (DNM) within, to and from the United Kingdom. Defence Nuclear Material Transport Operations are also known as DNM Transportation; Defence Nuclear Material in transit; Nuclear movements; and DNM movements.

The Special Escort Group of the Ministry of Defence Police, SEG (MDP), escort the nuclear materials and remain on standby during their transit. Immediate Response Forces (IRF) are embedded within the road and rail transports, and on standby with air transports.

Defence Nuclear Materials are moved using the following transport means:

Trident warheads are also transported to weapons facilities in the US where they are inspected to make sure that ageing materials don’t render them unreliable or unstable. This is via submarine to the US Trident submarine base at Kings Bay, Georgia
Nuclear weapon transport by road

UK Nuclear Weapon Convoy Layout
UK Nuclear Weapon Convoy Layout

Trident NW’s are contained within PD AWG 516 packages. These are kept on Load Transfer Platform Trolleys (LTPT) until moved by crane or put onto Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) carriers. Hence these transport operations are often referred to as TCHD Convoys.

The Mark I TCHD’s were Mammoth Majors. The current Mark II TCHD carriers are badged as Foden. These vehicles have cargo bodies designed to provide extra protection to the nuclear weapon containers.

The primary logistical movement of nuclear weapons is from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, to the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport in Scotland (part of HMNB Clyde). Because the warheads need to be constantly refurbished, batches are shuttled by road convoy several times a year. Convoys use Staging Posts (SP) and Crew Change Locations (CCL) during this journey.

The TCHDs containing the weapons are escorted in a convoy of MoD vehicles commanded by a Ministry of Defence (MDP) Chief Inspector. A crew (of up to 50 people) include a first aid team, fire crew and personnel equipped to monitor for radiological hazards. The convoy maintains contact by radio and telephone with Task Control, MDP Central Information Room, Wethersfield, Essex, which monitors its movement, and with the civil police force through whose area it is passing.

Police forces are notified at least 24 hours in advance of a convoy being routed through their area; this enables them to advise the convoy about any local traffic problems. Police forces may advise fire brigades of the presence of the convoy if it is moving into the vicinity of a fire brigade operation.

Three organisations are involved in the convoy, namely Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines, AWE civilian personnel and the Special Escort Group.

Convoy vehicles include:-

  • The Stand Off Escort – Royal Marines provide armed military personnel to counter any potential threat and the SEG’s role is the close escort (security) and traffic management throughout any convoy move.
  • The Escort Commander’s vehicle leads the convoy, navigating the routes and managing the timings by constantly being kept informed of traffic situations up ahead.
  • The TCHDs, or Truck Cargo Heavy Duty vehicles which carry the nuclear weapons. There are up to five in a convoy. Each AWE driver is accompanied by an armed SEG officer as close escort.
  • Fire Tender, with staff employed by AWE – the Convoy Safety Officer & Fire Crew
  • Convoy Commander’s Vehicle, manned by MDP Chief Inspector and his team.
  • The Traffic Car with two SEG police officers keep traffic behind by putting on a ‘rolling block’ whenever there is a traffic build up ahead or the convoy approaches hazards such as roundabouts or junctions.
  • Two miles behind the main part of the Convoy there is a Support Element that includes a Convoy Support vehicle, a Recovery vehicle and a Coach. The AWE provides a Deputy Convoy Safety Officer who is responsible for this element.

Many details on NW convoys are kept secret by the Government and MoD who operate a Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) policy on informing the public regarding NW convoys. Evidence given by the Nuclear Information Campaign to the Defence Select Committee (based on figures from campaign group Nukewatch UK for 2000 to 2006) give the number of convoys as ranging from two to six return journeys per year from Aldermaston to Coulport. Estimates of the warhead numbers transported during this period are that 88 were moved from Aldermaston to Coulport while 120 were returned, indicating a withdrawal of between 30 and 50 warheads leaving an operational stockpile of between 170 and 150 warheads.

The convoy is tracked by the Task Control, MOD Police (MDP) Central Information Room in Wethersfield, Essex and the Special Safety Cell (SSC) in Ensleigh, Bath. In the event of a nuclear accident the SSC would activate the MoD’s Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) and would alert the local police constabulary immediately.

The responsibility for these operations rests with the Director Nuclear Movements & Nuclear Accident Response Group (D NM&NARG). All mission critical support vehicles involved in the NW transport operation are owned by D NM&NARG. The vehicles were purchased by the MOD for use in their then current role from the Royal Air Force (RAF) Nuclear Weapon Convoy Group and transferred to D NM&NARG en bloc in 2002. Prior to 2002 the RAF were in commanding roles during NW convoys.

NW Convoys regularly get protesters regularly who try to stop the convoy and climb onto the TCHD’s. The MDP are trained on a regular basis to counter any protest. MDP motorcyclists and traffic car officers make arrests and then hand over responsibility to the local Police Force. For 22 years AWPC (Aldermaston Women’s Peace Campaign) have held a monthly camp outside the fence at AWE Aldermaston. Nukewatch UK tracks convoys and has provided evidence for the House of Commons Defence Select Committee (evidence from Nuclear Information Service)










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